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This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connections
in the brain and nervous system. These connections capture a type of “structural connectivity”
that is expected to inform our understanding of the functional nature of these tissues (Sporns
2007). This is due to the fact that neural connectivity constrains the flow of signal propagation,
which is a type of causal process in neurons. This work explores how tracers are used to identify
causal information, what standards they are expected to meet, the forms of causal information
they provide, and how an analysis of these techniques contributes to the philosophical literature,
in particular, the literature on mark transmission and mechanistic accounts of causation.
1 Introduction. In efforts to better understand the functioning of the human brain, many
projects in neuroscience examine the causal process of signal propagation along neurons. In studying
this causal process, a large amount of research investigates anatomical neural connections, which
constrain and track the flow of these signals (Sporns 2007). These anatomical connections capture a
form of “structural connectivity” that is thought to provide us with information about function, as
structure informs function.1 In fact, this is a significant motivation behind the human connectome
project, which aims to map all neurons and neuronal connections in the human brain (Lichtman and
Sanes 2008; Sporns 2012). In some sense, this project is similar to how we might study an electronic
device. If we are interested in how this device works we might start by identifying the circuit along
which the electricity flows. Similarly, we hope that identifying the “circuit architecture” of the
brain, will allow us to better understand how it “works” and how it enables higher-level cognitive
processes.2
One set of methods that have been used to study structural connectivity of neural systems are
tracer techniques. Many of these techniques exploit the fact that cellular materials are transported
along a neuron’s cell body and even transynaptically, across neurons that are connected in series.
When these transported materials are marked with an identifiable tag, scientists can follow the
tag as it flows along the causal process, “discovering” steps of the process that may have been
unknown or poorly understood. Successful application of these methods has led neuroscientists to
view tracers as a “fundamental technique” in this field and “the primary method for visualizing
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brain networks in all areas of neuroscience” (Levy et al. 2015, 57). This paper examines tracer
techniques in neuroscience with respect to (1) the standards they are expected to meet, (2) their
role in identifying causal information, and (3) the particular types of causal information that they
provide. In addressing these points, I clarify how an analysis of neuroscientific tracer techniques
contributes to the philosophical literature, in particular, the literature on mark transmission and
mechanistic accounts of causation.
2 Background. Neural connections are often described as “circuits” of causal pathways, which
allow for the flow of signals and information. This signaling is a type of causal process, which
propagates along individual nerve cells and chains of neurons in series. In these cases, an upstream
signal causes a downstream signal and so on, in a sequence that flows along the pathway. Whether
a signal is present at an upstream location or not “makes a difference” to whether it will occur at
a downstream location. This basic causal structure is accommodated by a minimal interventionist
framework (Woodward 2003). Within this framework, to say that X is a cause of Y means that
an ideal intervention (in background circumstances B) that changes the values of X, produces a
change in the values of Y. In this case, changing the presence or absence of an upstream signal,
causes (or is one causally relevant factor for) the presence or absence of a downstream signal. Given
three locations along an individual neuron, in sequential order (A to B to C), this captures a basic
difference-making relationship among them–the presence or absence of a signal at upstream location
A makes a difference to its later presence at downstream location B, and so on. The same can be
said of signal flow across three neurons connected in series (A to B to C), or more complicated
circuits of connections.
While neural signaling is viewed as straightforwardly causal, it has some unique features that
are not present in other types of causal systems. First, the causal process of neural signaling
involves the unique feature of having a (i) fixed, physical structure–this is the nerve cell and its cell
membrane along which signals and information flow. Even when signals are not being transmitted
down neurons, this physical structure is still present and it can be studied to get information about
the pathways along which signals move. This is similar to how we might study roadways in order
to get information about the flow of traffic through a city. Alternatively, other causal processes
lack such a fixed, physical structure. These include DNA replication, signal transduction, and
drug receptor interactions. In these cases, causal parts interact, but there is no large-scale physical
barrier that guides these interactions. In the case of neurons, this relatively fixed, physical structure
serves as a constraint that guides the flow of neural signals and information.
This fixed, physical structure has been studied with various techniques in order to better under-
stand signal propagation in neurons. One of these techniques is tract tracing in gross anatomical
dissection. This involves following nerve tracts through animal models or human cadavers in order
to identify which areas of the body they connect up. This work originated in the seventeenth
century with Steno’s “teasing methods,” which isolated nerves by distinguishing white matter from
grey matter (Heimer 2005). While these methods have led to various advances, they also face a
number of challenges. A first challenge is that nerve tracts can be exceedingly difficult to identify
and distinguish from other structures in the body, such as fascia and connective tissue.3 Second,
even when these tracts are accurately identified, they are a larger structure that is comprised of
many single neurons. If we are interested in single neurons and their connections, we will need other
3This is especially the case when compared to identifying blood vessels and other more distinct anatomical
structures.
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tools to identify these smaller-scale structures. Further challenges include the fact that these single
neurons are often highly tangled and that gross anatomical dissection does not reliably indicate the
directionality of signal flow.4
In order to overcome these challenges, neuroscientists have developed further techniques that
exploit a second unique feature of these causal systems. This second feature is that neural systems
involve the (ii) flow of material down each step of the causal process–namely, down each neural
cell and along chains of neurons connected in sequence. Weiss and Hiscoe’s (1948) identification of
axonal flow led to the discovery that neurons contain cellular materials that are shuttled along their
axons and from one neuron to another, through axonal and transynaptic processes, respectively.
Kristensson (1970) built on this by showing that cellular materials moving via axonal transport
could be tagged with horseradish peroxidase (HRP), in order to provide “direct observation” of this
causal process. This led to the development of tracer and tagging techniques, which involve tagging
these and other materials, in order to watch their flow along single neurons and neurons connected
in series (Martin and Dolivo 1983). By following an visualizable tracer, scientists can identify the
projections, length, and directionality of material flow along the neuron and along chains of neurons
connected in sequence. Tracing this flow of material is important, because it provides information
about the nerve membrane, which constrains and guides the flow of electrical signals. As the flow
of material and electrical signals are both constrained by the same cell membrane, studying one of
these processes (material flow) provides information about the other (signal flow).
The tracer experiments described above exploit transport processes in living neurons in order to
study their connectivity. While these techniques “continue to be the most reliable way of inferring
axonal connection in mammalian brains,” they are just one type of tool that neuroscientists use to
trace these connections (Shi and Toga 2017). Other neuroanatomical tract tracing tools include:
(1) gross anatomical dissection, (2) neural degeneration, (3) diffusion in fixed and post-mortem
tissue, and (4) in vivo diffusion MRI (Lanciego and Wouterlood 2011). While these techniques rely
on different types of information, they are all used to study neural connectivity and they contribute
to our understanding of brain and nervous tissue functioning.
This analysis focuses on neuroanatomical tracers that target axonal transport and transynaptic
processes in living neurons. In order to best understand how these tracers work we should examine
how they are used and what types of causal information they provide. I examine these points in
the next two sections and explore the implications of this analysis for the philosophical literature
on causation.
3 Neuroanatomical tracers: How and when are they used? Understanding how and
when tracers are used requires a brief description of what they are used for (this will be examined
in more detail later). In the context of neuroscience, tracers are used to identify neurons and their
connections–in particular, where a neuron is spatially located, what its most immediate connections
are, and where it resides in a larger network of connections. In this and other scientific contexts,
tracers are used to get information about the basic steps of a causal process–they trace the process
without providing detailed information about how it works. How exactly are scientific tracers used
to study causal systems? How do they differ from other causal investigative strategies and what
standards are they expected to meet?
4Additional studies would need to be performed (likely in living specimens), to determine the direction of
signal flow.
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3.1 Tracers: Scientific standards. A first important feature of scientific tracers is that they
need to trace something that is reliably moving through a causal process. What exactly this
something is depends on the causal process of interest. Consider causal processes that exhibit
material continuity in the sense that they involve some material that reliably flows through all
steps of the causal process. Neurons fall into this category because they involve cellular materials
that are shuttled along individual neurons and across neurons connected in sequence. Neurons
contain an axonal transport system with small molecular motors that shuttle materials along a
microtuble cytoskeleton, positioned along the length of the neuron. These molecular motors run
anterograde from the cell body to the axon terminal and retrograde from the axon terminal to the
cell body. Scientists explicitly analogize these transport processes to a freeway, stating that they
are a “rail like” system, in which “cargo [is] delivered” via “transport mechanisms” along “highways
within the axon” (Morecraft et al. 2014, 369).
This material continuity feature of neural transport processes has a number of advantages–in
particular, it can be exploited to study neural projections and neural connectivity. If this material
is tagged with a visualizable tracer, the tracer can be followed to reveal a single neuron’s spatial
location and its downstream or upstream connections. These tracers are viewed as “pathfinders in
the nervous system” as they chart individual neural projections and sequences of neural connections
along which this material flows (Ekstrand et al. 2008). In the context of neuroscience, these physical
tracers often include dyes, radioactive substances, and even viruses (Morecraft et al. 2014). These
tracers are distinguished on the basis of whether they flow in an anterograde or retrograde direction,
and depending on whether they move transynatpically or not. A transynaptic tracer is capable of
moving past the synapse and into downstream neurons connected in series. Interestingly, this basic
tracer methodology is not just found in neuroscience, as similar methods exist in various subfields of
biology (Ross 2019). For example, biochemists attach radioactive tracers to metabolites in order to
identify the steps of metabolic pathways. Similarly, ecologists attach radioactive markers to caloric
energy in order to identify the sequence of species in a food chain. In these examples, tracers are
attached to various materials that outline the steps of a causal process.
Stating that a tracer needs to “tag” something that reliably moves through a causal process is a
fairly obvious and underspecified requirement. There is much more to say about how this actually
works. I am going to suggest that, in order for a tracer to provide reliable information about a
causal system, it needs to meet particular criteria. These criteria are often implicitly assumed in
scientific work, and sometimes explicitly formulated, with significant variation.5 I identify three of
these criteria, which concern the (1) influence of the tracer on the causal system under study, (2)
the identifiability of the tracer, and (3) the ability of the tracer to tag exactly and only the causal
process in question.
According to the first criterion, the (1) tracer should not disrupt the normal causal process under
study. The tracer should provide us with information about how a system normally functions in
the world, as opposed to a system that is perturbed with the introduction of a foreign element.
This criterion is used to rule out toxic tracers, which can damage the nerve membrane and then
extravasate into extracellular regions. (This relates to the specificity of the tracer, which will be
discussed soon.) For these reasons, it is claimed that an “optimal” tracer should be “relatively
harmless” and have “minimal neurotoxicity” (Hu et al. 2013; Huh et al. 2010; Mi et al. 2019).
A second criterion ensures that the tracer is sufficiently identifiable so that it can be successfully
5For helpful discussions of “ideal” tracers and the criteria they should meet see: (Nassi et al. 2015; Hu et al.
2013; Huh et al. 2010; Mi et al. 2019).
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tracked throughout the causal process. This involves ensuring that the (2a) tracer is sufficiently
unique so that it is not confused with nearby entities in the system and that the (2b) tracer is
present in large enough concentration so that it does not dilute to the point of being unidentifiable
in later steps of the causal process. In the context of neuroscience, viral tracers are well suited to
meet (2b) as their ability to amplify and self-replicate increases tracer concentration.6 This allows
for “intense labeling” and “minimal fading,” which both allow for easier tracer identification (Hu
et al. 2013; Nassi et al. 2015).
A third criterion pertains to the tracer’s ability to tag exactly and only the causal process in
question. According to this standard (3a) the tracer should bind to material that reliably moves
through the causal process and it should (3b) bind to it firmly without falling off. There are many
ways that a tracer can fail to meet these standards. A tracer might firmly bind to some material, but
the portion it binds to could get spliced off at some point during the causal process.7 Alternatively,
even if material is reliably moving through a causal process, a tracer can fail by unsuccessfully
binding to it.8 Tracers will not provide reliable information if they detach from their target or if
they indiscriminately mark other entities in close proximity, which are causally irrelevant to the
system. The ability of a tracer to meet these requirements and tag exactly and only those neurons
that are synaptically connected is often referred to as “specificity” and the “specificity of tracing”
(Nassi et al. 2015).9 In this sense, a specific tracer “propagates exclusively between connected
neurons...allowing for the stepwise identification of neuronal connections of progressively higher
order” (Ugolini 2011). It is important that the tracer spread only through synaptic connections,
because information flow is restricted to these connections, and tracers are intended to reveal these
routes of information flow (Nassi et al. 2015). If a tracer were to indiscriminately tag nearby neurons
by diffusing through the extracellular space, this would no longer provide useful information about
signal flow. As Callaway states:
One of the most important characteristics to consider for any transneuronal tracer,
including neurotropic viruses, is whether spread is restricted to neurons that are con-
nected by synaptic contacts. Because the transfer of information between neurons is
primarily dependent on synapses (and gap junctions), the most relevant circuit diagram
is based exclusively on connectivity, not proximity. (Callaway 2008, 617)
The meaning and importance of having “specific” tracers is further clarified by Martin and Dolivo
6The self-replicating feature of viral tracers may seem to conflict with material continuity. While the par-
ticular material associated with the original, introduced viruses is unlikely to reliably flow across numerous
neural connections, what matters is that it does flow across the synaptic junction (from one neuron to an-
other). Material continuity is preserved at each causal link. A related point is discussed further in footnote
10.
7This would occur, for example, if a radioactive molecule was attached to a phosphate group, which is spliced
off a metabolite as it makes it way down a biochemical pathway. This is similar to attaching a bug to the
coat of a spy, in order to trace them, while realizing at some later point in time, that they have removed
their coat. Although the bug is still attached to the original material, this no longer follows the causal
process of interest.
8For example, if the spy keeps their coat on but the bug falls off, tracing efforts will again fail.
9One exception to this third criterion is when the tracer reliably flows with material moving along a causal
process, without directly tagging it. Examples of this are viral tracers in neural pathways and radioactive
tracers in blood vessels and the gastrointestinal tract. Although some of these tracers do not directly tag
material moving along the causal pathway, we have good reason to believe that they flow along with it.
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who state that “an ideal tracer [should be] selective and...stay in the considered pathways” (Martin
and Dolivo 1983, 268).
These three tracer requirements are articulated with a focus on causal systems with material
continuity. However, not all causal systems have this feature, as some lack the flow of material
from one causal step to the next. A biological example of this is a hormone cascade. In this case,
a molecule of some hormone binds to an extracellular receptor–this causes the intracellular portion
of the receptor to change conformation, which activates an intracellular enzyme, which results in
a downstream cascade of intracellular changes. Scientists view this process as legitimately causal
despite the fact there is no material that moves from the initial hormone through the downstream
sequence of steps.10 An ordinary life example of this is a sequence of dominos that fall over in
succession. In this case, toppling the first domino clearly causes the rest to fall over in series,
but again, there is not any material that reliably moves from the first domino down to the tenth
or twentieth domino. Kinetic energy or momentum might flow through this causal system, but
material does not. Instead of using a physical tracer that tags material, an alternative way to
study this system might involve tagging something that does reliably flow through it, such as
kinetic energy or momentum.11 It is worth considering whether the tracer criteria above could be
rephrased with respect to tracing these other entities, in order to better accommodate these causal
systems.
At this point, we can draw four main lessons from this analysis of tracer methodology. First,
there are important differences across types of causal systems that matter for tracer experiments.
Some causal relationships involve the flow of material, while others do not. This difference matters
for the types of tracers that can (and cannot) be used to study a causal system. Tracers that tag
material are best used for systems with material continuity, as opposed to systems that lack this
feature. Any account of causation that is used to understand tracer methodology should capture
these differences across causal systems and how they matter for tracer selection and use.
Second, developing and using tracers requires already knowing something about the causal
process of interest. For example, you need to know what property moves through the causal
system in order to know what you should tag and what will successfully mark this property. In
some sense, this is apparent in the three criteria for tracers. How are you going to know whether the
tracer meets the specified requirements unless you know what it is supposed to trace and whether
it succeeds in tracing this? This reveals a clear difference between tracers and causal discovery
10Notice that signal transmission in neurons also involves receptors, in a way that is similar to this hormone
example. Pre-synaptic neurons release neurotransmitters, these bind to receptors on postsynaptic neurons,
and this binding triggers downstream effects. As material is not reliably moving from the neurotransmitter,
to the receptor, to the downstream effects, this causal process appears to lack material continuity. If signal
transmission in neurons lacks material continuity, is this a problem for my analysis, which claims that
many neuroscientific tracers work by exploiting material continuity? No. The physical tracers discussed in
this paper (viruses, dyes, radioactive markers, etc.) are not directly tracing signal transmission in neurons.
They are tracing axonal transport and transynaptic processes that reliably move material (lysosomes
and viruses, for example) along and across neurons. Tracing (a) axonal transport and (b) transsynaptic
processes provides information about (c) signal transmission as all of these processes are constrained by
the physical contours of neurons and their sequences of connections. Furthermore, (a) and (b) are far
easier to tag and trace than (c), which helps explain why they are targeted with this methods. This is
discussed in more detail shortly.
11For example, signal tracers for electronic products and genetic tracers (that tag information) may count
as cases of this.
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methods involving statistical analysis of observational data and interventionist-type experiments.
With these latter methods the main question is whether a causal relationship exists between various
properties or not. When scientists use tracers they have already accepted that a process is causal–
what they want to know are other features of the process (such as, where it is located, what
upstream and downstream entities it connects up, and what intermediates are present along the
way). Relatedly, it should be clear that tracer experiments are not Woodwardian interventionist
experiments. While interventionist experiments involve manipulating a candidate cause to identify
its effects, tracer experiments involve “harmlessly” tagging a candidate cause, so that it (or its
effects) can be monitored at a later point in time.12
Is it problematic to say that a method of causal study requires knowing something about
the causal system before the method is used? In the case of neuroscientific tracers, scientists
already know how a type of system generally functions or operates, but they lack other fine-grained
information about it. For example, you can know that most neurons transport various materials
through axonal transport and synaptic processes, without knowing–for a given neuron or set of
neurons–where they are located, how they are connected, and which upstream and downstream
elements link up. In these cases, information about the causal system is used to develop a tracer
that can answer these questions. We see this in the historical development of tracers–only once
axonal transport was discovered were physical tags and tracers used to study neural connectivity.
Similarly, only once it was identified that caloric energy flows across ecological pathways, was this
knowledge used to develop tracers that illuminated the ordered sequence of species connected in a
food chain.
Third, neuroscientific tracers are a unique form of causal investigation because they are used
to study causal systems “by proxy,” in which information about one causal system is gained by
studying another. For example, although scientists in this area are primarily interested in how
signals flow along connections of neurons, they tag and study the movement of cellular materials
along these neurons. Scientists can tag axonal transport and transynaptic processes to learn about
signaling pathways because all of these processes flow along the same routes–all are constrained by
neuron cell membranes and connections of neurons in sequence. As both of these causal processes
are guided by the same physical constraint, studying one process gives you information about the
other (Callaway 2008). Why do scientists bother studying a causal system “by proxy”? Why not
just “directly” study the particular system they are interested in? Scientists might use this strategy
when one causal processes is easier to study than the other. If it is easier to tag and trace the
flow of material as opposed to the flow of information, this would explain why neuroscientists study
information flow “by proxy.” Of course, this option is only available when both processes are guided
by the same constraint, such that gaining information about one reliably provides information about
the other. Clarifying exactly how this causal study “by proxy” is justified and the different forms
it can take is a rich area for future work (Hooker 2012; Winning and Bechtel 2018; Winning 2018).
This work should address questions such as: Under what circumstances can studying one causal
system provide information about another? What justifies this strategy and are their different ways
it can be implemented?
Fourth, tracers appear to be used to study causal systems that involve a fixed sequence of
causal steps. These steps are “fixed” or “constrained” in the sense that they have a very particular
ordering–moving through the causal process requires following this particular ordering without
12For related discussion see Kästner’s distinction between interventions and mere interactions (Kästner 2017,
156).
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skipping a step or reversing their sequence. At any given step in these processes there are a limited
number of “next moves”–a limited number of downstream possibilities that the tagged material
could “move to” next. Contrast this with a situation in which a walker is roaming along an open
field. If we tag this walker with a tracer, their path is unlikely to provide a similar form of causal
information because their walking routes are not very constrained in this area. Once they move
to a first location there are a large number of possible downstream locations they could move to
next–they could turn around, walk 30 degrees to their right, 45 degrees to their left, and so on.
When scientists use tracers to study causal systems they typically study systems with a fixed order
of causal steps, in which this order is guided by various constraints. We see this fixed order in
metabolic pathways, vascular pathways, developmental pathways, ecological pathways, and many
others.13 Future work in this area should explore the role of constraints in these causal processes
and their relationship to tracer experiments. This work should also examine whether a “constraint”
is a particular type of causal factor and, if so, how these causes should be understood and how they
differ from other causes.
3.2 Contributions to existing views: Mark transmission and causation. Although this
paper has analyzed tracer techniques within an interventionist framework, these techniques are often
associated with mark transmission accounts of causation, such as those supported by Reichenbach
(1971) and Salmon (1984). Why not use these mark transmission accounts to understand neu-
roscientific tracers? How does an analysis of these tracer techniques bear on this philosophical
literature?
At first glance, neuroscientific tracer experiments appear similar to mark transmission accounts
of causation. These accounts have been articulated by Russell (1948), Reichenbach (1971), and
Salmon (1984) and they share the view that causation can be defined by the capacity of a process
to transmit a mark. In particular, it is suggested that genuine causal processes are capable of trans-
mitting marks, while non-causal processes (or “pseudo processes”) are incapable of this. Although
there are different conceptions of what counts as a “mark,” in much of this work various types of
properties have counted, such as “constituent material, bonding forces...geometrical shape” (Dowe
2018, 202) and “momentum, energy, or electric charge” (Salmon 1997, 467). For example, when
a minor car crash leaves a dent in a car’s door, this dent is a mark that is transmitted with the
car as it continues on its journey through town. On the other hand, the car’s shadow is a mere
pseudoprocess because various alterations to the shadow’s shape are not consistently transmitted
as it moves with the car. This view is said to accommodate many other ordinary life examples of
causal processes, including: scuffs on a fly baseball, snow on the roof of a railcar, carved initials on
a flying arrow, and chalk marks on a sequence of colliding billiard balls (Reichenbach 1971; Salmon
1984; Woodward 2016). In all of these cases, some physical mark moves through the causal process
in question.
Scientific tracers appear similar to these accounts, because they involve studying causal pro-
cesses by tracing properties or “marks” that flow through them. In fact, both Reichenbach and
Salmon appeal to scientific tracers in motivating their mark transmission views, suggesting that
they involve a similar rationale. As Reichenbach states, “radioactive tracers [are] used nowadays to
13Note that there are at least two different types of pathways in these cases. There are pathways that
involve changes in the physical location of some material over time (neural and vascular pathways) and
pathways that involve changes in the constitution of some material over time (metabolic and developmental
pathways).
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reveal the causal structure of circulation in living organisms” (Reichenbach 1971, 200). Relatedly,
Salmon claims that “[m]arking methods are sometimes used in practice for the identification of
causal processes” and that, more specifically, “[r]adioactive tracers are used in the investigation
of physiological processes–for example, to determine the course taken by a particular substance
ingested by a subject” (Salmon 1984, 154).
How exactly does an analysis of scientific tracers contribute to this philosophical literature? Do
these tracer techniques support mark transmission accounts of causation or provide insight into
their plausibility? I will outline two ways in which an analysis of neuroscientific tracers contributes
to this literature.
First, in contrast to Reichenbach and Salmon’s claims, an analysis of scientific tracers does not
support a mark transmission definition of causation. Reichenbach and Salmon are not just arguing
that scientists use tracers to study aspects or features of causal systems, they are suggesting that
causation can be defined by tracer transmission and that scientific tracers help illustrate this.
They suggest that tracers can be used to discover causal relationships and distinguish them from
non-causal ones. This is discussed by Salmon at various points throughout his work:
I believe that the mark method is an extremely useful tool for the discovery and study of
causal processes. A paradigmatic example is the use of radioactive tracers in studying
physiological processes (Salmon 1998, 20, emphasis added).
Marking methods are sometimes used in practice for the identification of causal pro-
cesses (Salmon 1984, 154).
One clear problem for this view–and for the claim that tracer methodology supports a mark trans-
mission definition of causation–is that scientists do not use these methods to establish or prove
causality.14 Instead, they use these methods to study features of systems that they already recog-
nize as causal. In many ways, this makes sense. Ensuring that you have a suitable tracer (and that
it meets the tracer criteria) requires that you already know various things about the causal system
of interest–these include what properties of the causal process you should (and should not) tag, on
the basis of knowing what reliably moves through it. Of course, we can attach a visualizable “tag”
to anything we want, but this alone is no guarantee that it will track a causal process at all, much
less one we are interested in. We know this, in part, because we know that marks can flow through
processes that we do not consider causal (Danks 2017, 204).
In fact, the experiments that neuroscientists use to establish and prove causality look a lot
more like interventionist-type experiments. The causal character of neural transport processes is
often justified with various interventionist-type evaluations, such as lesion, neural degeneration,
and constriction experiments (Morecraft et al. 2014). These studies reveal dependency relations
between cause-effect properties along these processes. When material is prevented from flowing
to upstream location A (by physically constricting the neuron) this material will fail to arrive at
downstream location B. Relatedly, when material is allowed to flow to A, (in proper conditions) it
will eventually flow to location B. A similar rationale guides lesion and degeneration experiments.
The fact that degeneration experiments establish a difference-making picture of neural transport
is suggested by Nassi et al, who state that “The very fact of Wallerian degeneration made it clear
14Scientists do use tracers to show that, for example, one neuron (1) is causally connected to another (2) on
the basis of the fact that a tracer moves from (1) to (2). However, using tracers to establish this causal
connection depends on the prior view of axonal transport processes as causal.
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that the distal part of the axon was somehow dependent for its viability on substances supplied by
the cell body, and, consequently, that there must exist mechanisms to transport these substances”
(Nassi et al. 2015, 2). This dependency was “experimentally confirmed” with constriction studies
(Weiss and Hiscoe 1948), and soon after, it was “exploited” with radioactively tagged amino acids
that were taken up by these processes and identified with autoradiography (Nassi et al. 2015, 2).
In this sense, the methodology of tracer experiments requires understanding the causal nature of
neural transport processes and this causal nature is established by interventionist-type experiments.
Second, this analysis contributes to the literature by defending mark transmission accounts
from a commonly accepted criticism. This criticism comes from Hitchcock and it involves the
example of a sequence of colliding billiard balls (Hitchcock 1995). In this example, the end of a
cue stick is covered in blue chalk and then used to strike a first billiard ball, which collides with
a second and so on, until a final ball falls into the corner pocket. According to Hitchcock, these
colliding billiard balls are a genuine causal process and this process is “marked” by the blue chalk
that moves along them. However, in addition to this blue chalk mark, there is another mark that
flows through this causal process, namely, linear momentum. Although both of these marks flow
through this causal process, we view the linear momentum–and not the blue chalk–as causally
(and explanatorily) relevant to the final ball falling into the corner pocket. Hitchcock’s main line
of criticism is that, mark transmission accounts are unable to distinguish the causally irrelevant
chalk mark from the causally relevant linear momentum. As any account of causation should meet
this explanatory relevance standard, mark transmission accounts are said to be inadequate. As
Hitchcock states “our demand that explanations provide relevant information requires...that we be
told which earlier properties the properties specified in the explanandum depend upon” (Hitchcock
1995, 311). A similar sentiment is echoed by Woodward who states that “there appears to be
nothing in Salmon’s notion of mark transmission or the notion of a causal process that allows one
to distinguish between the explanatorily relevant momentum and the explanatorily irrelevant blue
chalk mark” (Woodward 2003, 352).
The main problem with this criticism is that the chalk mark is not a suitable tracer for this
causal process–it would never meet scientific standards for tracers and it fails to meet our intuitive
understanding of what a tracer is. Notice that we are very hard pressed to agree that this chalk
mark can reliably move through a sequence of colliding billiard balls. At the very least, this requires
that the chalked portion of the first ball perfectly hits the second ball, and that the chalked portion
of the second ball perfectly hits the third ball, and so on through this sequence. The movement
of chalk through this process seems to rely on sheer luck and this fails to capture the principled
rationale that guides scientific tracer experiments.15 Scientists expect tracers to meet very strict
criteria–a tracer should mark some entity that reliably flows through a causal process and it should
mark it firmly without falling off. Chalk does not mark any such entity and it can easily fall off to
tag causally irrelevant factors. Using chalk as a tracer seems to assume that there is some material
that reliably moves through this causal system, but no such material exists. This example requires
that the chalk mark will effectively “jump” from one billiard ball to another, perfectly marking only
cause-effect relations. What guarantees that the chalk will do this? If two billiard balls collide, and
chalk flies into the air, what prevents it from marking entities in close proximity that are causally
irrelevant to the system? This case does not teach us that that tracers fail to mark causally relevant
properties. It teaches us that chalk is not a suitable tracer for this system.
15As Salmon and Reichenbach viewed their mark transmission accounts as supported by scientific tracer
examples, the failure of this example to reflect scientific reasoning about tracers should raise a red flag.
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What lessons should we take away from this example? In contrast to Hitchcock’s claims, this
example does not suggest that mark transmission accounts fail to provide an account of causation
(other things teach us this, as mentioned above). Instead, this example shows us that chalk is
not a suitable tracer for this system. A deeper lesson is that, if we want to understand causal
reasoning with tracers and tags, we should carefully examine our best scientific work in this area
and use this to inform an account of tracer methodology. Relatedly, we should carefully check
our philosophical examples to scientific practice to ensure that these examples accurately represent
scientific methodology. A basic understanding of tracer criteria in neuroscience shows that there
are flaws with this chalk mark-billiard ball example and that their are principled reasons that guide
tracer methodology.
This analysis of tracer techniques suggests that they fall short of supporting mark transmission
accounts of causation. This is motivated, in part, by the fact that scientists do not use these
techniques to establish causality–they use them to study systems that they already view as causal.
Despite challenges for defining causation on the basis of tracers (or mark transmission), these
techniques do have a principled rationale. In particular, these techniques do not succumb to
Hitchcock’s criticisms, as these criticisms apply to a case that fails to meet scientific (and likely
ordinary life) standards for tagging and tracer experiments. Appreciating the scientific use of these
methods, provides a clearer picture of their implications for philosophical analyses of causation and
the study of causal systems.
4 Neuroanatomical tracers: Causal information What types of insights relevant to de-
bates in philosophy of neuroscience about the nature of causal discovery does a philosophical anal-
ysis of tracer technology yield? One main insight has to do with the type of causal information
that tracers provide. In order to clarify this, consider mechanistic accounts of explanation, which
have dominated philosophy of neuroscience for more than a decade. According to these mainstream
accounts, causal information in neuroscience is always “mechanistic” information (Machamer et al.
2000; Craver 2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011).16 In this work, the notion of “mechanism” often
refers to a set of causal parts, which all mechanically interact to produce some behavior of inter-
est. These mechanisms involve (a) constitutive or part-whole relationships, (b) descriptions that
involve signifiant fine-grained causal detail, (c) causal relationships that are characterized in terms
of “mechanical” language, and (d) frequent analogy to the ordinary life notion of a “machine”
(Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Craver 2007; Ross 2019). First, mechanisms
are constitutive in the sense that their causal components are said to stand in a part-whole rela-
tionship to the mechanism behavior they explain. In fact, mechanisms are relative to the effects
they produce–discovering a mechanism requires first specifying some effect of interest and then
“drilling down” to identify its causal parts. This discovery process involves “decomposition” and
“localization,” in which a system is divided into identifiable lower-level parts that give rise to the
mechanism’s behavior (Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Bechtel and Levy 2013).
Second, scientists often expect the causal relationships in mechanisms to be described in sig-
nificant fine-grained detail. To say that you know the “mechanism of action” of a particular drug,
means that you know intricate details about how it leads to some downstream effect, as opposed
to just knowing that it has this effect. This feature of mechanisms is associated with our inter-
est in understanding how they work and our assumption that this involves identifying significant
16Many of these views rely on a basic interventionist framework (Woodward 2003), but add much more in
capturing the notion of “mechanism.”
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information about their causal components, organization, and so on. The expectation that mech-
anisms contain significant causal detail is suggested by scientific claims and expressed by many
philosophical accounts of mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000; Darden 2006; Craver 2007; Craver
and Darden 2013), although it is not universally accepted by all philosophers.17 A common view
is that mechanism descriptions should contain some kind of “complete” detail, while descriptions
that lack full detail are merely mechanism “sketches” or “schemata” (Craver 2007).
Finally, causal relationships in mechanisms are often described in mechanical language, with
force, action, or motion terms (Ross 2019). This is related to the fact that scientific mechanisms are
often analogized to ordinary life machines, such as car engines and clocks. For example, instead of
saying that a machine’s component “causes” a downstream component to do something we are more
likely to say that it “bends,” “pushes,” “pulls,” or “compresses” this downstream component. These
mechanical descriptions are common in neuroscience–this is evidenced by scientist’s claims that a
neurotransmitter “binds” to a receptor, which “opens” an ion channel, and ultimately produces an
“influx” of ions into the cell. This mechanical terminology goes hand-in-hand with our assumption
that mechanisms should be described in significant detail. Stating that component A “pushes”
component B, provides more information than simply saying that A “causes” B.
Although mainstream views in philosophy of neuroscience claim that all causal information is
mechanistic, the causal information provided by these neuroscientific tracers appears to be different.
Tracers provide information about sequences of causal connections–these are sequences of steps
along an individual axon or along a chain of neurons connected in series. These causal connections
lack the constitutive feature of mechanisms, they are not described in significant fine-grained detail,
and they emphasize mere causal connection over the mechanical detail of these connections. In
order to clarify these points consider a further piece of information. Instead of referring to these
neural connections as “mechanisms,” neuroscientists often describe them as “pathways,” which
they analogize to ordinary life examples of pathways, such as roadways, highways, and city streets
(Saleeba et al. 2019; Frick et al. 2013). These analogies are not just colorful, superficial expressions–
they capture important features of the causal information identified by neuroscientific tracers.
The causal pathways identified by tracers have at least four main features: they are represented
as having a (i) sequence of causal steps, where these steps (ii) track the flow of some entity or signal
through a system, (iii) abstract from significant causal detail, and (iv) emphasize the connection
aspect of causal relationships.18 When focused on a single neuron, tracers capture a sequence
of causal steps along the length of the neuron. In the same manner that a roadway captures a
route along which traffic can flow, these neural pathways outline a route along which material (and
signaling information) can flow. These routes capture causal steps that are “abstract” in the sense
that they capture the causal relations between spatial locations along the axon (upstream location
1, to intermediate location 2, to downstream location 3) without identifying any other causal
information. In particular, tracers do not provide fine-grained mechanical information about how
materials (or signals) move along these steps–they capture that these are the available steps, what
their order is, their location in the body, and which upstream and downstream tissues they connect
17While many diverse accounts of mechanistic explanation exist, some deny that mechanistic information
involves fine-grained or significant causal detail (Bechtel and Levy 2013; Boone and Piccinini 2016; Craver
and Kaplan 2018). My analysis relies on a “fine-grained detail” account of mechanism, which is suggested
and argued for in other work (Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2007; Darden 2006; Ross 2019).
18For more on these features and other examples of the pathway concept in science, see: (Ross 2019).
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up.19 In other words, causal pathways capture “that” 1 is causally connected to 2, but not “how”
they are causally connected, which is typically associated with mechanism information. This is
similar to the causal structure of a roadway on a map–this structure tells us “that” a car can move
from 1 to 2 to 3, but it does not tell us “how” the engine works to sustain this movement.
The causal pathway information that neuroscientific tracers reveal is not just relevant to studies
of single neurons, but also for understanding the complex causal connections among many neurons
in the brain and other nervous tissues. This connection information is represented in pathway maps,
connectomes figures, and neuron wiring diagrams. In the same way that a roadmap depicts available
causal routes that vehicles can travel along, neural pathway maps capture neural connections along
which signals and information can flow. As mentioned above, the causal pathway information
in these diagrams abstracts from fine-grain mechanical detail about how these entities flow along
causal channels. Abstracting from this mechanistic information is important because systems with
the same causal pathway structure, can have different fine-grained mechanistic details. Suppose a
set of roadways or neural pathways depicts connections from upstream location 1 to downstream
location 2, which is connected to downstream location 3, but there is no causal connection from
any of these to location 4. We know from this pathway structure that a vehicle or neural signal
starting at 1 can make its way to 2 and 3, but that it cannot travel to location 4. The fact that
we know this is unrelated to the fine-grained mechanistic details about how the vehicles or signals
move. This is evidenced by the fact that the same pathway structure can have different mechanistic
realizations–cars can have different engines (gas, diesel, electric, etc.) and neural signals can have
different fine-grained causal components (ion channel types, density of these types, and so on) (Ross
2015). In these cases, the shared behavior across various systems can be explained by their similar
causal pathway architectures, but not by their fine-grained mechanistic details, as these details
differ from system to system.
Neuroscientific tracers are used to identify causal connections in some domain–these connections
are often referred to as “causal pathways” and this connectionist information is represented in
pathway maps, connectome figures, and neuron wiring diagrams. While the causal connections in
these representations abstract from fine-grained mechanistic detail they also lack the part-whole
and effect-relative nature of mechanisms. They lack these features because the pathway components
represented in these maps do not all constitute a unified whole and they do not all “mechanically”
interact to produce a single explanatory target. Where a drug’s mechanism of action captures
an actual, single process (and single outcome) executed by the drug, pathway maps differ by
capturing a variety of possible causal trajectories, as opposed to a single causal process. This
is made more clear, by recognizing that neural pathway maps, roadmaps, and circuit diagrams
represent a different sort of causal structure than a machine. While a mechanism captures a set of
causal parts that all interact to produce a particular outcome, pathway maps represent a variety
of available causal routes in some domain. These differences are related to the fact that different
causal investigative strategies are used to study mechanisms and pathways. Mechanisms are studied
through a process of “decomposition and localization”–some explanatory target is fixed and then
one “drills down” to identify the lower-level mechanical parts that interact to produce the behavior
of interest. Pathways, on the other hand, are identified by tracers which involve a strategy of
19Pathways are also abstract in the sense that they represent complex processes with an economy of causal
steps (Ross 2019, 13). For example, the process of signal transmission from the spinal cord to the leg can
be represented in anywhere from one to three causal connections, which abstract from an innumerable set
of molecular steps.
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“expanding out” to identify causal connections, as opposed to “drilling down” to identify causal
parts. A tracer is attached to some material or information, after which it flows through causal
pathways and available causal routes in the system.
How do neuroscientists use pathway information to understand and explain neural systems?
When a comprehensive set of neural connections is represented in a neural pathway map, this
“connectome” can be used to better understand how neural circuits work. This is seen in the
use of “nanoscale connectomes” for C. elegans and Ciona intestinalis (DeWeerdt 2019). For these
organisms, pathway maps are an “important first step” in understanding animal behavior and
they serve as a “starting point for various hypotheses” (Jabr 2012). For example, inferences from
structure to function are made by ablating particular neurons, determining where they are located
in the connectome, and what resulting outcome is produced. In addition to providing positive
suggestions about function, circuit diagrams and tracers also serve an important role in hypothesis
exclusion. These methods are viewed as a “powerful winnowing tool” that is capable of excluding
various hypotheses on the basis of absent connections (DeWeerdt 2019). Tracers can provide
information about which areas are not causally connected, which can help in narrowing down the
possible functions of a given neural circuit (Kohara et al. 2013).20
Although tracers are able to provide these types of information, there are particular details
which they cannot provide. For example, tracers fail to capture more fine-grained information about
causal connections, including the dependency-relations they exhibit. Tracers capture directionality
and location of flow, but they do not clarify “how” this flow takes place. In fact, neuroscientists
admit that there are significant gaps in their understanding of how neural transport processes work,
despite the fact that they are tagging and tracing them (Saleeba et al. 2019). As mentioned above,
this additional fine-grained information is often irrelevant for particular questions about these
systems. If we want to know how traffic flows through a particular city, it does not matter much
how the vehicles drive along these roads–namely, the different types of engines that might propel
their movement. In this case we care about the more abstract causal structure and constraints
of the system. It is this information that tracers provide and that pathway maps are intended to
convey.
If neural pathway maps represent causal information, but it fails to meet mechanistic standards,
how should this information be understood? When scientists discuss the causal information and
causal structures that tracers identify, they refer to them in terms of causal “pathways” and not
causal “mechanisms.” In this context, “pathway” refers to something quite different than “mech-
anism.” Pathways are causal structures that involve (i) a sequence of causal steps, in which these
steps outline the (ii) flow of material or information, they (iii) abstract from significant fine-grained
detail, and they (iv) emphasize the “connection” feature of causal relationships (as opposed to a
mechanical one) (Ross 2019). These pathways capture causal connections in some system, which
are capable of answering explanatory why-questions that mechanistic information cannot answer.
For example, if you want to know whether one neural area is connected to another, you simply need
to know whether a causal pathway exists between them–you do not need to know the fine-grained
mechanical details of “how” information or material is transmitted from one to the other. Further-
more, where causal systems referred to as “mechanisms” are analogized to machines, causal systems
referred to as “pathways” are analogized to roadways, highways, and city streets. These ordinary
life pathways often exhibit the same features (i)-(iv) that are characteristic of neural pathways.
20If a tracer fails to move from one neural area to another, this suggests that these areas lack anatomical
connection and functional involvement.
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Scientists appear to be analogizing these neural systems to ordinary life examples of pathways,
in order to make complicated features of these neural connections more obvious and cognitively
accessible.
How exactly does this contribute to the literature? Part of what this analysis shows is that we
can not use the single concept of “mechanism” to interpret and understand all causal structures
in this domain. There are other causal concepts, such as the notion of “pathway,” that capture
distinct causal structures and distinct types of causal information. Recent work suggests that causal
structures referred to as “mechanisms” and “pathways” have unique features, involve different
causal investigative strategies, and figure in different types of explanations (Ross 2019). Part of
what this work reveals is that causal structures and causal investigative strategies in neuroscience
are much more diverse than mainstream mechanistic views have suggested.
5 Conclusion. This paper has examined how neuroscientific tracer techniques are used and
the particular types of information they provide. An analysis of these techniques bears on mark
transmission and mechanistic accounts of causal explanation. This work suggests that, while
scientifically-defined tracer methods fail to support mark transmission definitions of causation,
they remain legitimate tools of causal study. Furthermore, tracer techniques help capture the im-
portance of “causal pathways” in neuroscience and how they are poorly accommodated by existing
mechanistic accounts. These techniques suggest that neuroscience contains a diversity of causal
concepts, causal structures, and causal reasoning, which are not all captured with the single notion
of “mechanism.” While these conclusions relate to specific questions about the use of tracers in
uncovering causal structure, there are many further questions about how this structure bears on
our understanding of brain functioning, how it can be extrapolated from animal models to humans,
and how it might provide useful principles that generalize across various nervous systems.
An analysis of these tracer techniques also uncovers questions that should be explored in future
work. For example, while neuroscientific tracers typically track changes in a material’s location over
time, other scientific tracers appear to track changes in a material’s constitution over time. This
is seen in tracers for metabolic pathways, which identify changes in a metabolite’s constitution as
opposed to changes in its physical location. What are the similarities and differences across these
tracers? Additionally, neuroscientific tracers involve an intriguing causal study “by proxy” strategy,
in which one causal process is studied in order to learn about another. Under what circumstances
can studying one causal system provide information about another? Finally, constraints appear
to play a significant role in the causal processes studied with tracer and tagging experiments.
How are these constraints to be understood and what exactly is the role that they play? Given
the fundamental role of tracer experiments in neuroscience careful philosophical analysis of these
methods is a welcome move in philosophy and one that is likely to provide many more insights into
causal reasoning in science.
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